First price auctions are widely used in government contracts and industrial auctions. In this paper, we consider the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in first price auctions with discrete value distributions. We study the characterization of the BNE in the first price auction and provide an algorithm to compute the BNE at the same time. Moreover, we prove that the BNE is unique. Some of the previous results in the case of continuous value distributions do not apply to the case of discrete value distributions. In the meanwhile, the uniqueness result in discrete case cannot be implied by the uniqueness property in the continuous case.
Introduction

Our Contributions
• We give an efficient algorithm to find the BNE of the first price auction.
For any possible bid, by scrutinizing the bidders who might report it, we give a clear characterization of the BNE in the discrete setting. Previous methods make use of Nash's Theorem to prove the existence of the equilibrium in the continuous case, while we provide a constructively proof in the discrete case.
• We show that the equilibrium is unique in the discrete case (Theorem 11). The uniqueness result by Lebrun [16] relies on a technical assumption about buyers' value distributions. In contrast, we do not need any assumption. Furthermore, in the continuous case, we need to be very careful when a buyer's value is near the smallest value. In the discrete case, each buyer's strategy around the smallest value has relatively nice properties.
Related Works
Besides the closed-form solution of the equilibrium, there is also a line of papers that focus on other aspects of the problem [24, 23, 21] . The existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is given by Lebrun [13] , Maskin and Riley [19] , Athey [2] . They first show the existence for discrete distributions by applying Nash's Theorem. Then they show the existence in the continuous case by constructing a series of discrete distributions that approaches the actual continuous case. In this paper, we prove the existence result by construction. After proving the existence of the BNE, researchers began to consider the its uniqueness. For symmetric distributions, Chawla and Hartline [4] prove the uniqueness by ruling out asymmetric equilibria. For asymmetric distributions, Maskin and Riley [20] show that the equilibrium is unique for symmetric distributions with the assumption that there is positive mass at the lower possible value. Lebrun [14, 16] prove the uniqueness for more general settings but still with the assumption that the cumulative value distribution functions are strictly log-concave at certain points. Escamocher et al. [5] investigates the existence and the computation of BNEs in the discrete case, under the assumption that bidders can only place discrete bids. They consider both the randomized tiebreaking and the Vickery tie-breaking and give different results.
However, both the continuous and the discrete case without assumptions are still left open. In this paper, we solve the discrete value distribution case.
In the numerical analysis literature, Marshall et al. [18] give the first numerical analysis for two special distributions. Their backward-shooting method then become the standard method for computing the equilibrium strategies of asymmetric first-price auctions [3, 6, 17] . The backward shooting method first computes the smallest winning bid, then repeatedly guess the largest winning bid and then solving ordinary differential equations all the way down in the bid space to see if the smallest winning bid given by the solution to the differential equations matches the actual one. One common issue of this method is the computation error in solving ordinary differential equations. Bajari [3] uses a polynomial to approximate the inverse bidding strategy. To compute a solution with high precision, Gayle and Richard [9] use Taylor-series expansions. Our method belongs to the backward-shooting category. We do not need to solve ordinary differential equations, but the algorithm still needs to repeatedly guess the largest winning bid. Fibich and Gavish [8] propose a forward-shooting method and numerically solve the case with power-law distributions. However this forward-shooting method does not work in the discrete case.
Preliminaries 2.1 Model
Suppose the seller has one item for sale and there are n potential buyers N = {1, ..., n}. The item is sold through a sealed-bid first-price auction. Each buyer has a private value for the item, which is drawn according to a publicly known value distribution. In our setting, we consider the case where the each buyer's value distribution is discrete. Also, we assume that for buyer i, the value support is a finite set {v 1 i , v 2 i , ..., v di i } with cumulative distribution function G i . Without loss of generality, we assume 0 ≤ v 1 i < v 2 i < . . . < v di i . Every buyer places a nonnegative bid b i simultaneously. Let F i (b i ) denote the cumulative distribution function of buyer i's bids. We assume that buyers have quasi-linear utilities and no buyer overbids, i.e., no buyer will place a bid that is higher than his value. The buyer with the highest bid wins the item and pays what he bids. Each buyer's strategy is a mapping from his private value to his bid. The strategies form a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) if no bidder has an incentive to change his strategy unilaterally in the Bayesian setting.
In the continuous value setting, each buyer's strategy maps a value to a bid. For example, suppose there are two i.i.d. buyers with value uniformly distributed between [0, 1]. In the BNE, each buyer bids half of his private value.
But in the discrete setting, each buyer's strategy is randomized, and maps a value to a set of possible bids, with a certain probability distribution. Consider the following example. Example 1. There are two i.i.d. buyers. Each buyer has value 1 and 2 with probability 0.5. In the equilibrium, when a buyer's value is 2, it is possible for him to place any bid in [1, 1.5] , and the bid density function is
When a buyer's value is 1, the buyer bids 1 with probability 1.
Our objective is to find the bidding strategies that constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Before we start, we need to make an assumption of the tiebreaking rule to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. To see this, suppose there are multiple highest bids, and we allocate the item randomly among the corresponding buyers. In the following example, there is no BNE. [19] ). There are two buyers. Buyer 1 has two Suppose there is a BNE. There are 2 possible cases in the equilibrium.
Example 2 (Maskin and Riley
• Buyer 2 always bids 1. Buyer 1 has value 2, he wins with probability 1 if he bids 1 + where is a small positive number. Buyer 1's utility is 2 − 1 − . Thus buyer 1 always prefers a smaller as long as > 0. However if he chooses to be zero, Buyer 1 wins with probability 0.5 and the utility drops to (2 − 1) * 0.5 = 0.5. Thus Buyer 1 with value 2 has no best response.
• Buyer 2 bids 1 with probability strictly less than 1. Consider the lowest possible bid b that any buyer would place. Since no buyer overbids, we have b < 1. If both buyers bid b with positive probability then they both have incentives to bid b + . It cannot be a BNE. If one buyer bids b with zero probability then the other buyer will not bid b because he will lose. It cannot be a BNE.
It turns out that there is no BNE in this example if we break ties randomly. We consider an alternative tie-breaking rule introduced by Maskin and Riley [19] . When there are multiple highest bids, we will allocate the item to the buyer with the highest value. [19] ). Ties are broken by running a Vickrey auction among the highest buyers. 2 In the continuous value setting, this assumption is unnecessary, but in the discrete value setting, we need this assumption to deal with best response issue. Without this assumption, we will still get an approximate BNE using our algorithm. We will discuss more about this assumption(see Example 3).
Assumption 1 (Maskin and Riley
Some basic properties
To assist later arguments, we restate several properties of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, mainly summarized by Maskin and Riley [20] . 3 Giving all buyers' strategies, if any buyer can win with a certain positive probability by bidding b then we call b a winning bid. Without loss of generality, we assume the set of winning bids is closed and there exists a smallest winning bid b. As long as a buyer's bid is higher than or equal to b, he can win with a certain probability. If buyers' strategies form a BNE, the smallest winning bid b will be determined uniquely by the buyers' value distributions, which will be further discussed in Section 5.
According to Example 1, a buyer with a certain value v j i may place multiple bids. Let S i (v j i ) be the set of possible bids for buyer i when he has value v j i . Denote buyer i's all possible bids by S i , i.e., S i = j S i (v j i ). Maskin and Riley [20] show that for any winning bid b, there are at least two buyers i and j, such that b ∈ S i and b ∈ S j . [20] ). In the BNE of the first-price auction, for buyer i and any b i > b, if b i ∈ S i , then there must exist another buyer, who bids in (b i − , b i ) with positive probability for any .
Lemma 1 (Maskin and Riley
Proof. Buyer i's utility is positive since he can bid b + which implies positive winning probability and positive utility conditioned on winning. There is no buyer who bids b i with positive probability, otherwise buyer i can increase his utility by bidding b i + . If there is another buyer who bids in (b i − , b i ) with zero probability, then buyer i has an incentive to decrease his bid to b i − and strictly increases his utility. [20] show that, in first price auctions, a buyer would not give a particular bid with positive probability when this bid is larger than or equal to b. Lemma 2 ([20]). For any buyer i, there is no mass point above b in buyer i's bid distribution.
Maskin and Riley
The following lemma shows that when a buyer's value is larger than or equal to b, his bidding strategy is monotone in his value.
Lemma 3 ([20]
). For each buyer, bidding strategy is monotone in value, i.e.,
Let φ i (·) denote the buyer's inverse bid function, i.e., φ i (b) is the value of buyer i when he bids b. If b is in the intersection of S i (v) and S j (v), φ i (b) will be specified when it is mentioned.
Construct BNE given each buyer's possible bids
Our objective is to compute every buyer's strategy in BNE. Since a buyer's bidding strategy is monotone, it suffices to compute the bid distribution because we can map a buyer's value to a bid with the same quantile in his bid distribution. When the bid support is not continuous, there might exist two bids with same quantile. However we will specify the exact bid given a buyer's value.
In this subsection, we show that we can get the bid distribution if we know for any specific bid, who submit this bid in the equilibrium if necessary. Definition 1. The set of buyers whose bidding strategies include x is called "bidding set", denoted by Λ(x).
When there is no ambiguity, we use Λ instead. The following theorem is about the relationship between bid distribution and Λ. For any buyer set Λ, let F Λ (x) denote the product of the cumulative bid distribution of buyers in Λ, i.e., F Λ (x) = i∈Λ F i (x). We abuse notation and use v i (x) to represent player i's value when he bids x in the equilibrium, and also define
Then the bid distribution of every buyer in Λ is differentiable in this interval. In fact, for any x ∈ (b 1 , b 2 ) we have
With this theorem, we start from the highest bid in the union of everyone's bid support and let the bid decrease. At each bid, the above theorem tells the density of this bid. At last we will get the full bid distribution.
Proof. For any bid x ∈ (b 1 , b 2 ), we have
We use Eq. (1) to cancel out the term F Λ (b 1 ) and get
Since the right hand side of the equation is differentiable with x, the left hand side F i (x) is differentiable. Take derivatives on both sides, we get
Possible bids conditioned on each value
A BNE consists of n buyers' strategies. Each buyer's strategy consists of a set of strategies conditioned on the value. In this section, we characterize the basic component S i (v j i ), the possible bids from buyer i when his value is v j i . We prove that the closure of the support of S i (v j i ) is an interval when v j i ≥ b. When buyers' values are continuous, Theorem 1 in [14] proves that the support of a bidding strategy is connected for every buyer. This result no longer holds in the discrete value setting. Example 3 gives a value distribution and the bid distribution in the BNE. Fig. 2 gives the bid structure in the equilibrium. In this example, Buyer 3's possible bids have two parts.
Example 3. There are 4 buyers with discrete value distribution G.
To show BNE, it is equivalent to show the bid distribution.
We can prove a weaker result. W.l.o.g., we can assume S i (v k i ) is a connected interval by taking its closure, i.e., adding some isolated points. If the distribution is dense enough, e.g. Buyer 3 has some probability on the values between (9, 20) , Buyer 3's bid support will be connected.
Remark: In Example 3, ties happen with zero probability when winning bid is greater than b. Ties happen with strict positive probability when winning bid is b. Buyer 1 with value 2 bids 2 and Buyer 3 with value 3 also bids 2. By Assumption 1, Buyer 3 is the winner since he has a greater value. Actually, Assumption 1 is only used in dealing with the best response issue when players tie at the smallest winning bid b. Suppose the unique BNE under this assumption is E. We can create an approximate BNE with -BNE E which does not need the tie-breaking assumption, i.e., the highest bid are resolved randomly. The only change is that when a player is supposed to bid b in E and this players value is larger than b, we let this player bid b + in E instead. Therefore, the tie-breaking rule can be viewed as a way of obtaining an approximate BNE. Once the output of the algorithm is obtained, it still is an approximate BNE even without the tie-breaking rule.
The bidding set Λ(x)
In previous sections, we demonstrate each buyer's strategy consists of several intervals. A natural question is where do these different intervals from different buyers lie in the bid space? We answer thus question by computing the set of buyers who would bid x, i.e., Λ(x). In this section, we focus on the characterization of how Λ(x) changes. Definition 2. When bidding set changes at x, we use Λ + (x) and Λ − (x) to denote the buyers who bid in the upper neighborhood and lower neighborhood around x, i.e.,
We call buyers in N − Λ(x) as the waiting list at bid x. Take Fig. 2 as an example, Λ(8.
When a bid interval S i (v j i ) starts or ends at bid x, Λ(x) changes. We consider what the initial bidding set is and how it changes in Section 4.1.
The change in the bidding set
It is possible that the bidding set remains the same around some bid, but the corresponding value of some buyer has changed. We also identify this case as a change.
Proof. The first inequality is because buyer i has no incentive to bid b+ instead of b. The second inequality is because of Theorem 1.
The probability of a buyer's value should equal to the cumulative probability of the its bids in the bid distribution. By Theorem 2, the bid set S of a specific value is a connected interval. S begins at some bid x. As bid x goes down, the cumulative probability of S increases. When this cumulative probability matches the probability of the value, interval S ends. Formally, Theorem 3. Buyer i with value v k i leaves the bidding set at x when the cumulative probability of bidding set equals to the probability of the value, i.e.,
).
Take Fig. 2 as an example, S 1 (20) begins at bid 9 and accumulate the probability until bid 6. The cumulative probability of S 1 (20) is F 1 (9) − F 1 (6) = 1 − 11 24 7 3 which equals the probability of value 20. When some of buyers join the bidding set, by Lemma 7, we also have the following property. It can be proved by a contradiction argument.
Theorem 4. When buyers enter the bidding set from the waiting list, the buyer with smaller value can not leave strictly before the buyer with larger or same value.
Up to now, we only have the characterization in one direction where the buyer enters the bidding set from the waiting list, in the other direction there might exist many bid positions where the buyer can enter the bidding set. However, the following theorem gives the method to uniquely determine the position.
Theorem 5. Suppose buyer i has the largest value v i in the waiting list, he will enter the bidding set immediately when one of the conditions is satisfied.
• |Λ| ≤ 1 and v i > x. Next, buyer 1 has the largest value in the waiting list. Since there is only one buyer in the bidding set, according to Theorem 5, he also joins the bidding set.
Next, buyer 3 and 4 are in the waiting list with value 9 and 1. We check if Buyer 3 could enter the bidding set at bid 6. Since condition 1/(9 − 6) ≤ 1/(10 − 6) + 1(13 − 6) is satisfied, buyer 3 joins the bidding set. Buyer 4 has value 1 which is smaller than the bid, so we stop adding more buyers. After the operation, we have Λ(6) = {1, 2, 3}.
To determine the exact entrance position, we introduce φ * (x).
Definition 3. Given the bid x, define virtual value φ * (x) that satisfies the function:
The definition of φ * (x) is based on Λ(x). When Λ(x) changes, φ * (x) also changes as a consequence. Theorem 6. φ * (x) strictly decreases as x decreases.
Algorithm
We know how the bidding set changes given a bidding set. The remaining problems are what the largest winning bid b is and what the initial bidding set Λ(b) is. Actually given b, we can obtain Λ(b) easily. It is just an extreme case by setting bidding set Λ + (b) to be empty and we can compute how it changes using the same way.
If the highest winning bidb is given, we can compute the BNE in the following way. We let the bid decrease fromb gradually and compute how bidding set changes by Theorems 3 and 5. For any bidding set Λ(b), we can compute the probability density at this bid and obtain the BNE. In this process, either when the bidding set reduces to one buyer and no other buyer can be added in or when the bid reaches zero, the bid stops decreasing and the algorithm ends.
However we don't know the highest winning bid b in the beginning. We can guess one and generate a structure using the method described above. Different highest winning bids result in different positions where the algorithm stops, as shown in Fig. 4 . The structures we obtained with different highest winning bids are not necessarily BNEs. Only the algorithm with the correct largest winning bid will produce the right BNE. We use an additional constraint to verify the right BNE. The following lemma says the smallest winning bid can be computed from the value distribution directly using a relatively simple formula. So if an algorithm stops at a position different from this smallest winning bid b, we can tell the generated BNE is not correct. 
As long as a buyer bids larger than or equal to b, the buyer will win in some situation. We claim Buyer 1's smallest bid is exact b. On one hand, b must be larger than or equal to Buyer 1's smallest bid otherwise other buyer who gives b would always be beaten by Buyer 1. On the other hand, b must be smaller than or equal to Buyer 1's smallest bid since Buyer 1 should always have non-negative utility.
Predict the change location of bidding set
A naive way to compute how a bidding set changes is by decreasing the bid gradually and see whether and how the bidding set will change. We can accelerate this process by predicting the location of the change directly instead of waiting for a change.
We predict the location where the next change happens in the following way. Suppose the current change point is b 1 . There are two possibilities. Some buyer enters the bidding set or some buyer leaves the bidding set. For the first possibility, the buyer who has the largest value in the waiting list joins the bidding set first, denoted by buyer i. Then, to compute the entering position of buyer i, we can assume that all other buyers do not leave or enter the bidding set, and solve the equation in Theorem 5 for buyer i.
Let b 2 denote the solution. If all buyers in the bidding set do not leave the bidding set, then buyer i will enter the bidding set at bid position b 2 .
For the second possibility, we need to check which buyer leaves the bidding set first. For every buyer k ∈ Λ(b 1 ), we compute how much bid probability he needs to finish the current bidding interval, denoted by α. The position would be the solution b k,2 such that F k (b k,2 ) = F k (b 1 ) − α. Suppose the bidding set remains same before buyer k leaves and we still need α probability of the bid. By Theorem 1, we have
Define
It's easy to see that H i (x) = h i (x). Therefore, to compute the leaving position, we need to solve
In summary, we have to search all the possibilities. For each buyer in the bidding set, we check where he leaves if he leaves first. For the buyer with the largest value in the waiting list, we need to check where he would enter if the bidding set is unchanged. Then the nearest (largest) change point is the next change point. Each buyer with each value at most changes the bidding set twice, e.g. the entering and the leaving. So there are at most 2m changes points. For each change point, the algorithm solves at most n equations either in the form of (5) or (6) . Therefore we conclude the theorem.
Furthermore, when we solve equation (2) and (3), they both have efficient algorithms ( (2) is equivalent to a polynomial, and (3) is a root finding problem for a monotone functions).
Algorithm
We use a binary search method to guess the largest winning bid. For each guess, we generate the bid intervals for every buyer and get the position where the bid stops decreasing. Theorem 8 says this position is monotone in the guess of the largest winning bid. So by comparing the stopping position with the right smallest winning bid b. We learn whether the guess of largest winning bid is larger or smaller than the right one. It is worth mentioning that when updating Λ(b), it can be sometimes problematic when solving equation h i (x) = 0. However, this can be easily overcome by solving the following polynomial and discard inappropriate solutions:
We study the relationship between the input and the output of the algorithm. We demonstrate that two endpoints of each bid interval, which is generated in the structure, are both monotone in the guess of the largest winning bid. For example, in Fig. 4 , the bid interval for Buyer 3 with value 20 is [7.44, 8 .50] assuming b = 8.50 and it increases to [8.55, 9. 50] assumingb = 9.50.
For convenience, we let p j i denote ln
..,n,j=2,...,i k uniquely determines the value distribution G. For simplicity, we use {p j i } to represent {p j i } i∈[n],j∈[2,...,di] . We use E(b, {p j i }) to denote the set of bidding intervals given by Algorithm 1 with a guessed largest bid b and distribution G.
The proof is different from the continuous distribution. We prove it by analyzing the algorithm directly. When the largest winning bid changes a little, it might cause some of the bid intervals to start earlier. Then buyer set Λ(x) might change. As a consequence, the bid distribution changes. Then the impact on the structure becomes complicated. A buyer with a specific value interval could be affected by many times. We have to overcome the difficulty brought by the changing bidding set.
It is possible that some bid intervals remain the same position. But the position where the algorithm stops increase strictly. For example in Fig. 4 , the end point in E(8.5, {p j i }) is 0.35 and the end point in E(9.5, {p j i }) is 3.76. Next we prove the continuity of the extreme points of each bid interval when the guessb changes. 6 Existence and Uniqueness
Existence
In Algorithm 1, if the end point does not match the smallest winning bid, the structure we get is not a BNE. Suppose the end point is smaller than b. At the end point, for every buyer, the total probability of the bid distribution never reaches 1. So every buyer has positive probability not bidding above the end point. Buyers still have a chance to win by bidding the end point value. It contradicts to the definition of the smallest winning bid. Suppose the end point is larger than b. If the equilibrium exists, we should have equilibrium structure from the largest winning bid to b. But we cannot continue to generate the structure between b and the end point in a reasonable way, then we must have guessed an incorrect largest winning bid. Lemma 6. If the end point matches the smallest winning bid, the structure provided by Algorithm 2 is indeed a BNE.
When we set b = max v j i , the end point of Algorithm 1 would be max v j i . When we set b = min v j i , the end point of Algorithm 1 would be smaller than b. By Theorem 9, there always exists a b such that the end point matches b. Thus we have proved the existence result.
Theorem 10. A Bayes-Nash Equilibrium always exists when buyers have discrete value distribution.
Previously, people use Nash's Theorem to prove the existence of BNE in discrete value distribution. First the existence if proved when the bid space is restricted to a finite discrete bid. Then people take the limit of the Nash equilibrium with full bid space. However, they haven't shown how to find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in discrete space.
Maskin and Riley [20] also propose a forward shooting method to find the equilibrium. They construct BNE from the smallest winning bid. Under some condition, they can give the solutions to the ordinary differential equations around the smallest winning bid. However, this method does not work for discrete setting, because we don't know the bidding set at first unlike bidding set includes every buyer in the continuous value case.
Following Algorithm 1, it is easy to note that for two buyers with identical distributions, they must join the bidding set and leave the bidding set simultaneously.
Corollary 2. Two players with identical distributions have identical bidding strategies. Furthermore, if all players with identical distributions, i.e. under symmetric distributions, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is symmetric.
Uniqueness
In reality, we do not have b in advance. We have to search for it. By monotonicity, we can learn whether the guessed bid is small or large. Corollary 1 says only one largest winning bid can make the end point of Algorithm 1 matches the smallest winning bid.
Theorem 11. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is unique when buyers have discrete value distribution.
By uniqueness, we mean the equilibrium above the smallest winning bid is unique. In Example 3, many distribution of bids for these buyers that stays below 2 can also yield an equilibrium. But we only focus on the structure above the smallest winning bid.
In the continuous distribution case, in order to prove the uniqueness result, Lebrun needs the distribution to be strictly log-concave (f i /F i is strictly decreasing) at the highest lower extremity of the supports, i.e. v 1 1 in our example. Briefly speaking, he uses this assumption to handle the case that there is some buyer always gives bid that is larger than b. Well in discrete setting, as our theorem says, we do not have such a situation.
The idea is that in the continuous case, the player with type in that particular local area involves in BNE. While in discrete case the player with type in that particular local area has trivial strategy and thus does not involve in BNE.
When we search the largest winning bid, the initial interval containing the largest winning bid can be easily obtained. It cannot be smaller than the smallest winning bid, and also cannot exceed the max possible value. Using binary search, we can approximate the correct largest winning bid with arbitrary accuracy. In fact, it has higher accuracy than the smallest winning bid. If the stopping criterion kicks in, then the smallest winning bid is near the actual one, which in turn implies that the max winning bid is also close to the actual one, making the output an approximate BNE.
Our algorithm does not have the sensitivity issue that are difficult to address in continuous algorithms.
Experiment
Accuracy comparison between the first and the second price auctions
When buyers have discrete value distributions, one natural way of computing the BNE is to approximate the discrete value distribution with a continuous one. Of course, there are infinitely many ways of approximation. Our choice is to replace a discrete value with a "triangle" probability density centered at that value, and cover the interval [v 1 i , v di i ] with a small uniform distribution. Formally,
For simplicity, we assume that for all i and d, |v d+1
Note that although we stick to this approximation throughout this section, our analysis also applies to other possible ways of approximation.
We implemented the continuous backward-shooting algorithm using the characterization by Maskin and Riley [19] :
ALGORITHM 2: The continuous backward-shooting algorithm Input: step s, max winning bid guessb Output: the min winning bid
Using a smaller step size s could significantly increase the number of loops inside Algorithm 2. However, using a smaller s could also make the computation result more accurate. Also, when
fi(ti) could be very large. Therefore, using a relatively large s could lead to a sudden decrease of t i , causing the program to skip other v d i 's in between. The above problem can be avoided by carefully tuning the parameter s. However, the possible large values of Fi(ti) fi(ti) can also cause other problems that may not have easy solutions:
a large Fi(ti)
fi(ti) leads to a large t i (b), meaning that t(b) decreases much faster than b. This problem could cause the program to terminate early if t(b) becomes smaller than b.
2. in the next loop, t i (b) can be negative and t i will oscillate as a result (see Figure 6 ).
To understand the first problem, consider the following example:
Example 4. Consider the case where there are 6 buyers. Their value distributions are as follows: early. The reason is that during the execution of Algorithm 2, when b is near 0.12, t 2 is near 0.25, but t 2 is over 1500. This means that a slight decrease in b could lead to a significant drop in t 2 , making t 2 < b and terminating the algorithm.
To understand the second problem, consider the case where t i is close to b in the BNE for some b. Then t i will very likely to be negative according to Equation (4), and it is not clear how we could avoid such problems since the computation of t i is independent of s. Although the continuous backward-shooting algorithm can be problematic, our experiments show that it has good performance if we only need to figure out the maximum winning bidb. The problems we mentioned mainly affects the computation of the strategies for smaller values. The computation of this part of strategies also suffers from sensitivity issues, as discussed in [7] . To overcome this difficulty, Fibich and Gavish [7] proposed another algorithm where guessing the maximum winning bid is no longer needed. We also try their algorithms and conduct experiments. When it comes to approximating discrete value distributions with continuous ones, the computation still suffers from sensitivity issues due to very high condition numbers, implying that the sensitivity might be an intrinsic issue of this problem. Figure 6 : The oscillation of continuous algorithms. The two curves corresponds to buyer 1's equilibrium bidding strategy computed by both the continuous and the discrete algorithms.
However, our discrete algorithm does not use continuous distributions to approximate discrete ones, thus can avoid all the above problems. The computational complexity only depends on the number of value points. Also, our algorithm does not have the oscillation problem or sensitivity issues, since our theoretical analysis already characterize the structure of the solution, and involves none of the sensitivity computation mentioned above. Therefore, our discrete algorithm can provide a much accurate solution compared to other ones. Such a high accuracy enables us to perform further researches related to first price auctions (see Section 7.3 for example).
Running time comparison between continuous algorithms and our algorithm
In this section, we compare the running time of previous continuous algorithms and our discrete algorithm. Since the algorithm provided by Fibich and Gavish [7] often gives a condition number issue, we only compare our algorithm with Algorithm 2 in these experiments. We conduct experiments for three different settings. For each setting, the experiment setup is as follows: We generate 1000 first price auction instances, with each containing n buyers. For each buyer, we sample d different values from the interval [0, 1], and the corresponding value distribution is also randomly generated for each buyer. Then both our algorithm and Algorithm 2 are applied to compute the Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Both these two algorithms need to guess the maximum winning bid, so the final computed minimum winning bid would be different from the actual minimum winning bid. Therefore we also set a tolerance parameter tol, which serves as a stopping criterion (i.e., the algorithm terminates when the difference between the computed minimum winning bid and the actual minimum winning bid is smaller than tol). As these algorithm runs, we record the running time of the algorithms on each instance. Considering that in some cases, the algorithms may take a very long time to terminate, we set another deadline parameter T , and kill the process once the running time exceeds T . During the experiments, we make sure that no other programs are running and at any time, only one algorithm is running on one instance. Also, we only compare the running time in these experiments, so detailed solution qualities are ignored. The parameters for the three settings are as follows:
• small: n = 5, d = 5, T = 30 seconds;
• medium: n = 10, d = 10, T = 60 seconds; For the 1000 small instances, although we set a much smaller tolerance value tol = 10 −8 for our algorithm, our algorithm finishes on almost all instances (955) within the 30 seconds deadline, Algorithm 2 finishes on only 256 instances when tol = 0.1 and on only 22 instances when tol = 0.01. For medium instances, our algorithm finishes on 512 of them, while Algorithm 2 does not finish on any instance within the deadline. And for large instances, no algorithm ever finishes on any instance within the deadline. It is interesting that our algorithm either finishes very quickly, or does not finish after a relatively long time. For example, among the finished 955 small instances, almost all of them finish within the first 3.5 seconds. This is also true for medium instances. The reason behind this observation is still unknown. We believe this is closely related to specific value distributions in the instances.
Welfare comparison between first and second price auctions
In this section, we compare the welfare of the first price auction and the second price auction, which we denote by W el f and W el s , respectively. The ratio W el f /W el s is called the price of anarchy:
Definition 4 (Price of anarchy (PoA)). The price of anarchy of the first price auction is defined as the minimum ratio between the welfare of the first price auction and that of the second price auction, i.e.,
where the minimization is over all possible value distributions.
For general n players, [10] shows an example with P oA = 0.869 and [11] proves that PoA is at least 0.743. We try to answer this question by running our algorithm on approximate discrete value distributions. We only consider the problem with two players. Our result provides evidence, though in a limited searching space, that the correct ratio would be around 0.869.
There are infinitely many value distributions, thus it is impossible to enumerate. However, we could just search for the smallest ratio W el f /W el s in a much smaller discrete space as follows:
For simplicity, we normalize the value distributions so that the maximum possible value is 1. It is easy to see that there are only 1 2 M +d d M +d d + 1 distinct value distribution pairs. According to Lebrun [15] , if two value distributions are "close", then the corresponding bidding strategies and the resulting welfare values are also "close". Therefore, the minimum ratio in the above discrete space should shed us with some insight about what the actual continuous distribution that minimizes the welfare ratio.
In our experiments, we choose d = 6 and M = 10. Thus there are 1 2 16 6 16 6 + 1 = 32068036 value distribution pairs to consider. We computed the ratio W el f /W el s for all of them, and the smallest one (W el f /W el s = 0.89638) is given by the following value distributions:
In this example, Player 1 has a constant large value while Player 2 has a low value distribution. It coincides with the example introduced by [10] , i.e., there is a player with a large constant value, while the other players have the identical distribution over a low value range.
Therefore, we make the conjecture that in the extreme case where PoA achieves its smallest value, there exists a player with constant value which is larger than the other players' values.
First Price Auctions with Reserves
homogeneous reserves
We can reduce the problem to the case with no reserve by decreasing every players' values. Given value distribution G and reserve r, we define new distribution G * (x) = G(x + r), x ≥ 0. Then we compute s * i (x) ∀i in BNE for G * with no reserve. The strategy in equilibrium also decrease by r. Therefore we can reconstruct the BNE by strategy s i (x) = s * i (x) + r if x ≥ r and s(x) = 0 if x < r.
heterogeneous reserves
We give an example with three players. Player 1's value is 12. Players 2 and 3 have two different types. They have three different reserves r 1 = 0, r 2 = 1 and r 3 = 7. The distribution is given as Example 6 in the appendix. In this example, Player 3 has an atom bid on her reserve r 3 . Because the existence of atom bid above the smallest winning bid, Theorem 2 does not hold anymore. Even if we consider continuous value distribution, the gaps still exist. No player bids in lower neighbor interval around it otherwise she has an incentive to bid r 3 + which brings her a large increase of winning probability but only sacrifices a little on the utility conditioned on winning.
Both Player 1 and Player 2 have gaps in their bid support, (2, 8) and (2, 7). It can be proved that these two gaps always share a same lower terminal. But the higher terminals are different, e.g., Player 1 leaves the bidding set at 8 while Player 2 leaves the bidding set at 7. Until now, we do not have an easy method to compute the positions of these gaps directly. We might have to guess. In summary, to compute BNE with reserves, we have to guess not only the largest winning bid but also the positions of all gaps in the bid support.
Conclusion
From theoretical point of view, by scrutinizing the structure of the BNE, we first propose Algorithm 2 to compute it. If we dive into the Algorithm 2, it does not need to solve the ordinary differential equations unlike in the continuous distribution case. The number of computation times is at most 2nm. Then, we show the BNE is unique without any distribution assumption. From practical point of view, Algorithm 2 is much faster than the traditional algorithm when computing BNE under the same discrete distribution. Algorithm 2 is also more robust on providing the strategies on small values shown in Example 5. Our algorithm has a great advantage over the traditional algorithm in the application in industry auctions, where faster and robust algorithms are much preferable.
Holding this strong tool, we compare the revenue generated in the first and the second price auctions. It shows that either auction can perform extremely better the other. Price of anarchy of first price auction is also measured in a set of approximate distributions, we give a conjecture about the extreme case based on our observation.
At last, our result can be easily generalized when homogeneous reserves involve in. We discuss the new difficulty when players have heterogeneous reserves.
APPENDIX A Omitted proof in Section 3
To prove Theorem 2, We first claim a lemma which compare buyers' value from the bid distribution.
Multiply two equations and get
By Lemma 2, there is no mass bid in buyer i's bid distribution between
If v j = v i , all the inequalities should be equality. Then we have F j (b 2 ) = F j (b 1 ).
A.1 Proof for Theorem 2
Proof. We prove the theorem by contradiction. Assume there is a value with a jump in its bid set. By jump, we mean the closure of the support of S i is not connected. Let v k i = max j,l {v l j | S j (v l j ) has a jump.}. Since there is a jump, we assume b 1 , b 2 ∈ S i (v k i ), and (b 1 , b 2 ) ∩ S i (v k i ) = ∅. Assume buyer j with value v l j has bid in this interval (b 1 , b 2 ). By Lemma 7, we have v l j ≥ v k i . If v l j = v k i , then buyer j with value v l j has zero probability bidding in the interval (b 1 , b 2 ). There is no impact when the probability is zero. So we can regard this case as buyer j does not bid in (b 1 , b 2 ).
If v k j > v i , by the assumption that v k i is the largest value that has a gap in the support, we know S j (v l j ) has no jump. S j (v l j ) is a connected interval. So we can get S j (v l j ) from S j (v l j ) after removing possibly infinite points.
Let set Λ 1 denote the buyers who bid in the upper neighborhood of b 1 and Λ 2 denote the buyers who bid in the lower neighborhood of b 2 . Formally, we have
Buyers who bid in (b 1 , b 2 ) have connected bidding intervals. By Lemma 1, the union of these connected bidding intervals cover (b 1 , b 2 ). So set Λ 1 , Λ 2 are well defined and not empty. For any j ∈ Λ 1 , we claim b 2 ∈ S j = h S j (v h j ). Otherwise, S j has jump around b 2 . Then we define
By Lemma 7, we have v k i ≥ v * j . By the monotonicity property (Lemma 3), we have v * j ≥ v j . Thus we have v k i ≥ v * j ≥ v j > v k i , a contradiction. So for any j ∈ Λ 1 , we have b 2 ∈ S j which implies j ∈ Λ 2 . Thus Λ 1 is a subset of Λ 2 . Since bid b 1 + does not generate more utility than bid b 1 , for buyer i with value v k i , the derivative of (v k i − x) j∈Λ1 F j (x) at x = b 1 is non-positive. Taking derivatives, we get j∈Λ1 fj (b1) Fj (b1) ≤ 1 vi−b1 . By Theorem 1, we should have 1
Since buyer i weakly prefer bid b rather than b 2 − , similarly we should have
Based on these two equations, we have,
By Theorem 1, for any j ∈ Λ, we have
Since it is impossible that for all j ∈ Λ it is equality, so the sum of inequalities is a strict inequality. Thus we prove Eq. (5).
Lemma 9.
In all possible changes, φ * (x) weakly decreases.
Proof. We consider the general case at bid b. Consider Fig. 9 .
We want to prove 
Sum over i ∈ Λ 3 in Eq. (6), and we have
Sum over i ∈ Λ 1 in Eq. (7), and we have
Combining the two inequalities above completes the proof.
value v 1 1 . Hence, the bidding set only contains buyer 1 at the end point. Other buyers' next values are smaller than or equal to the value at end point. Then we put the remaining bid probability of buyer 1 on bidding b. We are also able to create a bidding strategy For other buyers when their value smaller than or equal to b, we create a bidding strategy such that they bid b deterministically. In this case buyer 1 does not have incentive to deviate from bidding b and other buyers never win in the following second price auction because their values are smaller.
